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Abstract—Named Data Networking (NDN) is a new kind of
architecture for future Internet, which is exactly satisfied with the
rapidly increasing mobile requirement and information-depended
applications that dominate today’s Internet. However, the current
verification-data accessed system is not safe enough to prevent
data leakage because no strongly method to resist any device or
user to access it. We bring up a lightweight verification based
on hash functions and a fine-grained access control based on
Schnorr Signature to address the issue seamlessly. The proposed
scheme is scalable and protect data confidentiality in a NDN
network.
Index Terms—NDN; Verification; Schnorr Signature; Hash
functions;
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet has become one of the most important in-
frastructures in modern society for promoting the progress in
all fields of the global economy and society, in which, the
scale of users and types of business are expanding rapidly [1].
The traditional TCP/IP network protocol is designed to meet
the needs of physical address based communication. With the
rapid expansion of network scale, the disadvantages of poor
security and low content distribution efficiency are exposed.
In order to better meet the needs of users, cope with the
unprecedented challenges brought by the current development
of the Internet, necessity of future development, and realize
the sustainable development of the network, Named Data
Network (NDN) has introduced. In NDN communication, the
receiver (data consumer) communicates through two different
types of packets: interest packet and data packet as shown
in Fig. 1. Its communication is consumer-driven, and data
can be transferred in the form of blocks [2]. NDN routing
nodes complete forwarding of data through three important
data structures, namely, Forwarding Information Base (FIB),
Content Store (CS), and Pending Interest Table (PIT) [3].
Unlike the traditional end-to-end TCP/IP network archi-
tecture, in NDN, routers directly obtain matching copies of
messages from nearby node caches by forwarding the user’s
interest packet request without having to route to the data
source [3]. This kind of non-end-to-end communication mode
makes sharing more efficient, but at the same time faces the
problem of message security. Users in NDN can quickly obtain
matching packets only if the message is reliable, while with-
out message authentication mechanism, the NDN network is
Fig. 1. NDN packets
vulnerable to attacks such as malicious tampering of messages
and man-in-the-middle attack. To solve this security problem
each packet needs to be authenticated in the NDN network [4].
Each packet need to be digitally signed and the information
obtained from the signature can be used to authenticate the
integrity and authenticity of the message. In NDN, because
the data packet is generated at the data source, the data
packets are needed to be authenticated for many times in the
forwarding process [5]. Therefore, when studying the message
authentication mechanism, computing efficiency, bandwidth
efficiency, and authentication cost need to be comprehensively
considered. This research is motivated by these observations.
In this paper, we bring up a lightweight verification and a
fine-grained access control technique based on hash functions
and Schnorr Signature mechanism, respectively. This tech-
nique focuses on the issue of preventing data leakage, which
is the purpose of safe verification and data access control.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Named Data Networking (NDN)
Different from the traditional IP network architecture, NDN
uses hierarchical name structure rather than IP address for the
purpose of packet forwarding and routing. NDN includes two
types of packets: interest packet and data packet. In order to
request content, consumer sends an interest message with the
content name. If in the router the content is cached, then the
router sends back the requested content. Or if the router do
not have the content, then the content producer sends back
the requested content. There are three types of data structures
in the NDN network: Forwarding Information Base(FIB),
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Content Store(CS) and Pending Interest Table(PIT). The FIB
reserves the next hop interface to allow the router to reach the
producer hamdane2015credential. Data contents are cached by
CS. PIT tracks the interests that has not responded and their
arrival interface in order that the requested can be returned
down the reverse path.
B. The Identity-based Combined Public Key(ID-CPK)
Combined Public Key (CPK) is an encryption algorithm that
generates a large-scale Public Key combination with a small
amount of resources. Based on the identification-based digital
signature protocol and Key exchange protocol, it satisfies the
scale of proof and the straightness of verification. It realizes
the assumption of Shamir [6] and opens a new way to solve the
scale by combination. In 2007, a two-factor composite public
key TF-CPK was formed on the basis of the composite public
key, which retains the advantages of the composite public key,
enhances the security, realizes the composite digital signature
and key exchange mechanism, respectively, and solves the
difficulty of defining signature key by individuals in the
centralized management mode.
C. Schnorr Signature Method
In cryptography, a Schnorr Signature, a digital signature,
which is generated by Schnorr Signature algorithm described
by Claus Schnorr [7]. This kind of digital signature scheme
is famous for its simplicity. Its security is on the basis of the
intractability of some discrete logarithm problems. It is valid
and generates a short signature [8]. It was overdue in February
2008 covered by US patent 4995082.
D. Hash Functions and Merkle Hash Tree Algorithm
A hash function plays a role of mapping data of any size
to a fixed size value. The value returned by a hash function is
called a hash value, hash code, digest, or simple hash. These
values can be used to index a fixed-size table which is named
a hash table. Using a hash function to build an index for a hash
table is called hashing or decentralized storage addressing.
The hash function and its relevant hash table are used in
data storage and retrieval applications. The data is accessed in
a small and almost constant time during each retrieval, and the
storage space is only one larger than the total space required
by the data or the record itself. Hash is a form of data access
that is computationally and storage space efficient. It avoids
the non-linear access time of ordered and unordered lists and
structured trees. The usual exponents when directly accessing
the state space of large keys or variable-length keys storage
requirements.
The use of hash functions depends on the statistical charac-
teristics of the interaction between the key and the function:
the worst-case behavior is unbearably bad with a very small
probability and the average-case behavior can be close to the
best-case (minimum collision) [9] .
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Unlike the traditional protocol, such as TCP/IP, access of
data by their physical addresses, the NDN structure is mainly
linked to names of the data instead of data locations to
realize better content searching and acquirement. In addition,
the security is important aspect of internet protocol need
to improve, in other word, NDN has necessity of a better
performance in security aspect than traditional architectures.
However, there are still some security problems need to be
solved, one of them is the data leakage.
Fig. 2. Process at a NDN node.
Fig. 2 shows the packet transmission process at a NDN
node. When data packet transmits in a path, the signature and
signed information might be accessed by any user or devices
without proper verification and access control.
Previous work on the security aspect of NDN mostly
focused on the packet that was transmitted, such as the size
of the file, the type of the file, or increased transmission time
to reduce the risk, which do not have strong practicability.
One of them is the Broadcast Encryption (BE) access control
mechanism. BE is used for distribution content symmetric key,
but failed to effectively solve the user collusion key problem.
In some proxy re-encryption schemes, edge routers are beeping
and a random key is generated to re-encrypt the data before
it is used. In CPK encryption, random key and re-encrypted
data response are used. The user then requests the decryption
key to CPK, but re-encryption operation takes up excessive
computing overhead on edge router. In this paper, we proposed
a lightweight and fined-grained method to protect the security




Fig. 3 describes the system model of the proposed scheme,
which combines the signature verification and access control
parts. It shows the basic steps of the system. The detailed
descriptions are as follows.
The three-way authentication structure is the main model of
the whole system, which is depicted in Fig. 4. The signature
and verification are contained in the three verification process.
The detailed method and related equations are introduced in
the following section as mathematical model.
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Fig. 3. System Model
Fig. 4. Identy Verification
B. Proposed Scheme
To solve the above problem and develop a relatively secure
network transmission architecture, this paper presents a Fine-
grained Access Control (FGAC) for NDN. FGAC is Com-
bined with identity-based Combined Public Key (CPK) [7]
and efficient security Schnorr signature method on the edge
to edge routers for three-way anonymous user security for
illegal users request filtering. To complete the record fetching
and trace FGAC after three-way authentication on legitimate
users, the shared secret key and the lightweight one-way
hash function [9] is used. To reduce subsequent certification
cost and efficient key distribution the FGAC combines with
Cryptography Based Identity [10] (IBC) and improved Secret
Sharing [6] method.
For the verification and access control part, this technique
uses hash function and Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) algorithm
[11] to realize the lightweightness, which has been mentioned
in both the algorithms,
Algorithm 1 Signature Generation Algorithm
Input: C (Content), Rc(set of routers), C1(1-cacheable),
CN(non-cacheable), CA(all-cacheable), Key vector X’, X†, X
stands for common routers, CR, node for user, i (requesting
router);
Output: Signature required encryption S
1: X’← x’1, x’2, ···, x’n;
2: P’ ← h(f(h(x′1))‖f(h(x′2))‖ ··· f(h(x’n));
3: if C == CN then
4: for r=1 to 2l do
5: yr ← X‖X;
6: end for
7: else if ((i belongs to Rc) and (C == C1)) then
8: for r=1 to 2l do
9: yr ← X† ‖X;
10: end for
11: else if (C = CA then
12: for r=1 to 2l do
13: yr ← X ′‖X;
14: end for
15: end if
16: g ← MHT(P’ + C);
17: for i=1 to 2l do
18: if gi != 0 then
19: si ← yi;
20: si ← CPK(si);
21: else




1) Signing Process: The Algorithm 1 shows the signature
process based on CPK. In order to construct a better signature.
The CPK is required to get a fresh token vector(key) X
and then uses the Hash Function to produce a fresh token
(according first and second step). In non-cachable condition,
a vector y1, y2, y3, ···, y2l is produced by CPK through
connecting two Xs, where X is the key vector connected with
the tokens transmit to the users (step four). This assures that
only the produced signatures can be verified by the users.
Similarly, in one-cacheble and the content requester condition,
the y set is created based on connecting X† and X, where the
X† is generated for i like step six. In all-cachable condition, the
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CPK is required to produce the bit vector through connecting
public tokens X and X’. In step 10, the MHT algorithm was
used by CPK to build a bit vector g. After that, it produces
signature S according to the bit vector g. Because each g
produces the signatures either for users or routers, we need
to connect g to produce the signature for both NDN routers
and users (step eleven). From step 14 to 16, the algorithm
checks if bits in g are equal to 1 or not, and gives the different
to the signature sj. Finally, the signature is constructed by
connecting all the signature parts. The content signature, the
content payload, a token that is used to verify the signatures,
a token to update in the NDN router node, and a token to
refresh in the user nodes together consist the content packet
under deliver after the whole computation process.
Algorithm 2 Verification Algorithm
Input: C(Content), S(Signature), P(the token set), P’(the
Content public key), TW(three-way verification function), M
(calculated in three-way verification);
Output: True or False
1: g ← MHT(P’ + C);
2: if S matched routers then
3: k ← 0;
4: else
5: k ← l;
6: end if
7: for j=z+1 to z+l do
8: if gj = 1 then
9: vj ← h(f(sj));
10: else
11: vj ← sj;
12: end if
13: end for
14: V ← h(V z + 1‖V z + 2‖... V z+l);
15: return S ← s1||s2||···s2l;
16: if m = 1 then
17: while i=1,i¡4 do
18: ki = TWi(h(uid),Mi)















2) Verification Progress: The second procedure, signature
verification progress algorithm, also proceed in an NDN node.
Actually, it has many same steps from the Algorithm 1. At first,
in step 1, the vector g is computed with the MHT algorithm,
which is according to the token P in the content packet and
the received content. Every signature(si) in S is used directly
by the node to build a new bit vector V. In one condition,
when a router is considered as the NDN node, only the first
part of signature in S is needed to get the components in v.
In another condition, if the NDN node is a node for users,
the progress can immediately start at the second part(step 5)
of signatures in S to compute the V. In step 7-13, the NDN
node computes all relevant sj according to the bits in g, like
step 12-18 in Algorithm 1. When all the components of bit
are constructed, we come to the three way verification part,
use the the three check function in the mathematical model
part to check the connection between router and user, then the
algorithm connects vj and produces the Hash value of the final
signature V. Then, it compares the CPK previously sent to the
NDN node of the token with the signature. If V has matched
the token in P, it means that the process has successfully
verified the node’s authorization to access the content. In other
words, the content can be transmitted to the user applications
or to the Content Store. Otherwise, the content is deleted.
C. Mathematical Model
The data requested by users is divided into three categories:
unrestricted shared content, restricted content, and restricted
content requiring access verification. When a user requests
content, which is classified into 3 categories, the edge router
must initiate an authentication request along with an Authenti-
cation State Table (AST). The router waits for the confirmation
that the user has completed the ”Three-way Verification”.
(i) The first verification: At this stage, the edge router is in
the LISTEN state waiting for the user’s connection request. In
this process, the user needs to hide its certificate to get W,Eu
in order to prevent the attacker from intercepting the signed
certificate. First, the user needs to get the current timestamp T1
and huid = H2(UID‖TS), then selects two positive integers
u1, ru as random numbers, and finally calculates as follows.
R1 = u1 ·G (1)
hT = H2(T1) (2)
Ru = ru ·G (3)
W = hT · U +Ru (4)
E
′
u = (htEu) ·G+Ru, h1
= H2(CPK‖R1‖T1), Z1 (5)
Then, add M1 as calculated by the equation 6
M1 = {T1, Ts, R1, Z1,W,E
′
u, CPK} (6)
to the interest packet named /Router/1/huid and send the
interest packet to the edge Router. At this point, the user is
in the state of SYN-SENT, which is waiting for a matching
connection response.
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(ii) The second verification: After the edge router receives
the interest packet of the connection request, it first verifies
whether T1 is in the valid range. If T1 is not within the valid
time range, the interest packet is dropped; otherwise, check
whether the corresponding CPK or intermediate node request
is cached. The edge router then verifies that Ts is less than Ta
by the equation 5. If the verification is successful, a positive
integer u2 is selected as a random number and then calculate
the following equations:
R2 = u2 ·G (7)
Ku = u2 ·R1 (8)
h2 = H2(CPK‖R1‖T2) (9)
Where T2 is the current timestamp. Finally, the edge router
creates a new entry in the AST and gives the M2 =
{T2, R2, h2} response to the user. At this point, the edge router
is in the SYN-RECEIVED state, waiting for the user’s final
connection confirmation. If no acknowledgement is received
within a certain time frame, the corresponding entry in the
AST is deleted.
(iii) The third verification: After the user receives M2, verify
whether T2 is within the valid range using the equation 10.
h2 = H2(CPK‖R1‖T2) (10)
If the validation is successful, calculate h3 by the equation 11.
h3 = H2(CPK‖Ku‖T3) (11)
Add M3, calculated by the equation 12, to the interest packet
named /ContentName/EOF and send to the edge router.
M3 = {T3, h, CPK, h3} (12)
At this point, the user is in the ESTABLISHED state by com-
pleting the authentication connection and starting the request
for content “ContentName”. When the edge router receives
the acknowledgement, it checks to see if T3 is greater than the
timestamp in the AST entry and verifies by the equation 11. If
the authentication is successful, the connection is successfully
established. The edge router transmits the interest packet into
the core network, updates the corresponding item in the AST,
and start recording the access information at the same time. If
the user does not request data for a long time, the edge router
releases the connection and clears the corresponding entry in
the AST.
After the Three-way verification, if the timestamp meets
the requirements, the edge router updates the timestamp of
the corresponding item in the AST and transfers the interest
packet into the core network.
V. DISCUSSION
In the paper, we have presented two algorithms by using the
CPK, Schnorr signature, and combination of the hash function
and MHT algorithm as the verification part. It also divides
the access request in three types and gives different signature
and verification steps for each part. The proposed scheme fits
to the three-way verification in the data access control. By
using division and the hash function, it increases the rate of
the verification and avoid the high-cost process in traditional
method. The FGAC model presents the security protection
in the combination of high quality signature and verifica-
tion, which has higher level of safety. The proposed scheme
provides data confidentiality by stopping malicious users to
read data passing through the edge routers. When a new node
is attached with the existing NDN network, CPK selects an
unused polynomial and calculates the United Signature. When
CPK updates the secret value s and polynomial, it only needs
to update w and q without the need of the authorized user’s
holdings. Therefore, the Secure Secret Key method improves
the scalability. In the first handshake, the sent message has a
timestamp, which prevents the attacker in reply attack. Since
the request does not contain real identity information, the user
request privacy does not disclose through the insecure channel.
To be mentioned, the three-way verification use the similar
verification algorithms to check the connection between the
user and the edge rounter, which can effectively reduce the
risk of the illegal visit. In signature construction, Schnorr
Signature method we used is famous for its simplicity, which
reduced the complexity of the verification to some extent. In
addition, the proposed scheme has divided the requested data
into three categories, which is convenient to carry out targeted
verification. In this way, the edge router plays an auxiliary
verification role in the process, which makes the to realization
of light-weightiness of the proposed scheme. That is, three
package of verification is not complicated and further lighter
than traditional method. Hence, it realizes the light-weight in
current level.
Due to the complexity of the verification systems, we
further develop the security and privacy based on the CPK
signature. So, we focus on the signing algorithm, content
encryption, content decryption, and content verification. These
four algorithms play as the base of signature security to apply
on the NDN system.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the paper, we bring up a lightweight verification mech-
anism for NDN to achieve a complete and exhaustive verifi-
cation mechanism. We also further discuss the fine-grained
access control to assist the main security architecture. In
future, we have the plan to focus on the development of a
more efficient access control mechanism by combining the
specific feature of NDN to improve the CPK authentication.
We still have a lot of work to do in the future for the pro-
posed scheme, such as, proof the concept through simulation
and implement it on real network.
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